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ARE WE THERE YET?
TAKING “TRIPS” TO BRAZIL AND
EXPANDING ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS
MEDICATION
INTRODUCTION

O

n May 4, 2007, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil
signed a decree to import a generic version of the Merck owned
HIV/AIDS drug Efavirenez.1 This unprecedented decree was issued after
failed negotiations with Merck, during which Brazil’s health ministry
rejected an offer by the company to lower the drug’s price by thirty percent.2 Brazil cited the compulsory licensing provision in the Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”),
claiming that this provision allows the government to override pharmaceutical patents in cases of national emergency or public interest.3
TRIPS is the international trade agreement that gives pharmaceutical
companies patent rights in every member nation of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).4 Patent protection provides the patent owner a temporary monopoly to exclusively produce and sell a certain medication.5
Patent rights are important because they allow pharmaceutical companies
to recoup and make a profit on the high research and development costs
invested in making a drug, thus incentivizing the creation of new medication.6 However, due to the owner’s temporary monopoly power, patent
rights allow the patent holder to charge prices for the drug that may be
prohibitively high for some developing nations.7 Acknowledging the
1. Compulsory License Issued for Merck’s Efavirenz, 21 World Intell. Prop. Rep.
(BNA) No. 6 (June 2007) [hereinafter BNA Report].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE
AGREEMENTS 17 (2007), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm#
understanding_chapter (download Chapter 2: The Agreements for pdf version). [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS].
5. FREDERIC M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT
LICENSING 84–85 (1977).
6. Id. at 84.
7. See Mark C. Lang, What a Long, Strange “TRIPS” It’s Been: Compulsory Licensing From the Adoption of TRIPS to the Agreement on Implementation of the Doha
Declaration, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 331, 331 (2004) (discussing how one
of the main reasons for the high HIV/AIDS infection rate in developing countries is the
high prices of pharmaceutical products produced by Western companies). But see Bryan
Mercurio, Resolving the Public Health Crisis in the Developing World: Problems and
Barriers of Access to Essential Medicines, 5 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 1–5 (2006) (arguing that the focus on patent regulation is largely misguided because many factors, such as
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prohibitive costs of essential medicines to developing countries due to
patents, certain flexibilities and exceptions were written into the TRIPS
agreement.8
One such flexibility is the compulsory licensing provision.9 The compulsory licensing provision allows developing countries to produce or
buy generic versions of the patented medication, thus reducing the cost
of the medicine.10 The compulsory licensing provision has been invoked
more than a dozen times, including by economically deprived countries
with very high rates of HIV infection.11 However, middle-income countries like Brazil have frequently used the threat of the compulsory licensing provision in order to have stronger bargaining power in their negotiations with pharmaceutical companies.12 Brazil’s recent use of the provision to import generic HIV/AIDS medication has created heated controversy as to the meaning and intent of the provision. The pharmaceutical
industry argues that as a middle-income country with a relatively low
rate of HIV infection, Brazil’s use of the provision is not necessary and
sets dangerous precedent by encouraging overuse of the provision.13
lack of proper healthcare systems and corruption, are responsible for the ongoing health
crisis in the developing world). See also Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs: The
Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the
Remaining WTO Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 1069, 1116–17 (1996). The market does not provide a solution for optimal drug
pricing in the context of developing countries. Id. Although pharmaceutical companies
generally provide different pricing schemes to different countries (based on what “the
market will bear”), this pricing scheme still creates prohibitively high drug prices for
many developing countries. Id. at 1117. The problem is in defining what is optimal.
Pharmaceutical companies want to maximize their wealth and the drug prices reflect this.
However, the optimal goal of the law should be to minimize the cost of health care without ruining the pharmaceutical industry’s incentives to create more drugs. See ANTHONY
OGUS, COSTS AND CAUTIONARY TALES: ECONOMIC INSIGHTS FOR THE LAW 30–31 (2006).
This price will be different than the price that pharmaceutical companies want to sell at in
order to maximize profits. Id.
8. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 42. Governments
are allowed to reduce the short term costs of intellectual property protection, such as
public health problems, through the various exceptions in the TRIPS agreement. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Consumer Project on Technology, Examples of Health-Related Compulsory Licensing, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2007) [hereinafter Consumer Tech].
12. Id. Brazil, in its negotiations with various pharmaceutical companies, has threatened at least three times to issue a compulsory license for generic production of the drug
before the parties reached an agreement. Id.
13. Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., Statement on Brazilian Government’s Decision
to Issue Compulsory License for STOCRIN (May 4, 2007), http://www.merck.com/
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This Note will discuss Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision to import generic HIV/AIDS drugs and analyze whether Brazil’s
actions are consistent with the meaning and intention of the TRIPS
agreement. Part I of this Note will present a brief overview of the TRIPS
agreement. Part II will explain the compulsory licensing provision in the
TRIPS agreement and discuss how the provision has been used in the
context of producing generic HIV/AIDS drugs. Part III will discuss the
recent controversy surrounding Brazil and Merck. Finally, Part IV will
analyze the validity of Brazil’s actions under the compulsory licensing
provision and present policy arguments for and against Brazil’s use of
the provision. This Note argues that Brazil’s recent use of compulsory
licensing is valid under the TRIPS provision. It will be effective in
strengthening Brazil’s bargaining power with pharmaceutical companies
and ensuring that Brazil continues to be able to provide HIV/AIDS
treatment for its citizens.
However, the use of the compulsory licensing provision by other middle-income countries to import or produce generic HIV/AIDS medication
demonstrates that the use of the provision should be evaluated on a case
by case basis and may not set good policy in every circumstance. Thus,
this Note concludes by arguing that the compulsory licensing provision
does not provide an adequate remedy to the prohibitively high cost of
medicines in developing countries. This Note adopts an additional remedy to the access problem in which the students and faculty of research
universities play an important role in creating greater access to essential
medicine in developing countries.
I. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Intellectual property rights can be defined as “the rights given to people over the creations of their minds.”14 The protection of intellectual
property rights has become an increasingly important concern in interna-

newsroom/press_releases/corporate/2007_0504.html [hereinafter Merck Statement];
Press Release, PhRMA, Compulsory Licensing Trend Dangerous (May 14, 2007),
http://www.phrma.org/news_room/press_releases/phrma:_compulsory_licensing_trend_d
angerous/ [hereinafter PhRMA Press Release].
14. WTO, Frequently Asked Questions about TRIPS, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). Intellectual property rights are
divided into two main categories: (1) copyrights: rights granted to authors of original
artistic works; and (2) industrial property: this includes protection of distinctive signs
such as trademarks and industrial property such as inventions (protected by patents),
industrial designs, and trade secrets. Id.
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tional trade.15 The extent of protection afforded to intellectual property
varies widely throughout the world and this can provide a source of tension in economic relations between countries.16 As a response to the
ever-growing concern over intellectual property protection, the nations of
the WTO negotiated the TRIPS agreement.17 The TRIPS agreement entered into force on January 1, 1995, and “is to date the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property.”18 The agreement is
an attempt by the WTO to standardize the protection of intellectual property rights throughout the world by establishing minimum levels of protection that each WTO member country must provide for the intellectual
property of other WTO members.19 The preamble of TRIPS generally
describes the objective of the agreement, which is to reduce the impediments to international trade while promoting the protection of intellectual
property.20

15. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 39. See also
Weissman, supra note 7, at 1075–87 (discussing the role of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry in influencing the drafting of the TRIPS agreement and how intellectual property
rights was framed as a trade issue).
16. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 39.
17. Id. The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was created in 1995 as a successor to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) established at the end of World
War II. WTO, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN BRIEF 3 (2007),
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf. The WTO’s objective is to help
trade flow “smoothly, predictably, and freely.” Id. at 1. The WTO has 150 member countries, which accounts for approximately 97% of world trade. Id. at 7. The WTO typically
makes decisions through a consensus of its members. Id. The WTO’s agreements are a
result of negotiations between the member countries. Id. at 4. The 1986–94 Uruguay
Round negotiations resulted in the current set of WTO agreements. Id. at 4. One of the
agreements that was negotiated during the Uruguay Round was the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”). See UNDERSTANDING THE
WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 39.
18. World
Trade
Organization,
Overview:
The
TRIPS
Agreement,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2007)
[hereinafter Overview of the TRIPS Agreement].
19. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 39.
20. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. The preamble of the TRIPS agreement reads: “Desiring
to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to
ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.” Id. at 84.
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The TRIPS agreement provides protection for inventions such as
pharmaceutical patents.21 The agreement gives the pharmaceutical patent
owner exclusive rights for making, using, offering for sale, selling, and
importing the drug in every member nation of the WTO.22 By providing
the patent holder exclusive rights to make and sell the drugs they have
developed, TRIPS prevents the emergence of competition based on the
reduction of production costs.23 In this way, pharmaceutical companies
hold a temporary monopoly power over the drug in all WTO member
nations.
One of the main arguments for granting this monopoly power is that it
provides an incentive for the future development of medicine.24 By conferring a temporary monopoly over a certain drug, TRIPS allows pharmaceutical companies to recoup the research and development (“R&D”)
costs of producing the drug.25 If companies could not recover their R&D
costs and make a profit on selling the drug, they would have less of an
incentive to invest in producing the drug in the first place.26 Thus universal patent protection provides a mechanism to encourage future R&D on
new medicines.27

21. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 41. To qualify for
patent protection under the TRIPS agreement, an invention has to be new, it must be an
“inventive step”, and it must have “industrial applicability.” TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 20, art. 27(1). Patent protection over pharmaceutical drugs lasts at least twenty years
and must be available for both products and processes. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE
AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 41.
22. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 28.
23. Fredrick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY: UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 393, 408 (Keith
E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).
24. Henry Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives for Neglected Diseases: Lessons
from the Orphan Drug Act, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY: UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 457, 462 (Keith
E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). “Patents have been found to be critically
important to pharmaceutical firms in appropriating the benefits from drug innovation.”
Id. It takes millions of dollars to develop and get approval for a new medicine. Id. Absent
market protection, other companies could imitate the drug and free-ride on the innovator’s work. Id. Because imitation costs in pharmaceuticals are extremely low relative to
the inovators’s costs of developing the new medicine, some form of market exclusivity is
required to allow innovators to appropriate enough of the benefits from the drug innovation to cover their large R&D costs and make a profit. Id.
25. CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 275 (2007).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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However, the exclusive monopoly power that TRIPS confers to pharmaceutical companies is problematic. Approximately two thirds of the
150 WTO member nations are developing countries.28 As a result, a major issue arising out of pharmaceutical patent protection under the TRIPS
agreement is how to ensure that pharmaceutical patents do not prevent
sick people in these developing nations from having access to medicines.29
II. THE COMPULSORY LICENSING PROVISION
Acknowledging the difficulties that developing countries may have in
conforming to the TRIPS agreement, certain flexibilities and exceptions
were written into the agreement.30 One such exception is compulsory
licensing.31
Compulsory licensing allows another producer to make a patented drug
without the consent of the patent owner.32 Compulsory licensing helps
ensure that developing countries have access to medicines while protect-

28. WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO—DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 93 (2007),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES].
29. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 42.
30. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 28, at 93. Excluding compulsory licensing, the other three main exceptions to patent rights are: (1)
article 27, permits exclusion from patentability where necessary to protect public health
and the environment; (2) article 30, which permits member nations to provide limited
exceptions to patent exclusivity contingent upon a showing that the interests of the patent
owner are not unreasonably infringed upon; and (3) article 40, which allows a government to impose price controls or nondiscriminatory taxes. TRIPS Agreement, supra note
20, arts. 27(2), 30, 40(2). See also Weissman, supra note 7, at 1099. Exceptions to exclusive rights are permitted when needed to “protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance” to economic development; to prevent “abuse of intellectual property rights;” and to prevent unreasonable trade practices
that “adversely affect the international transfer of technology.” TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 20, arts. 8(1), 8(2). Flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement include extra time for lower
developed and least developed countries (“LDCs”) to fulfill their commitments. Id. arts.
65.2, 66.
31. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 42.
32. WTO, TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET 4 (2006), http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm00_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS AND
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET]. Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement, entitled
“Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder” is the compulsory licensing provision of the TRIPS agreement. Id. It allows member nations to make “use of the subject
matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government of third parties authorized by the government.” TRIPS Agreement, supra note
20, art. 31.
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ing the rights of the patent holder.33 Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement,
entitled “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder,” is the
compulsory licensing provision of the agreement.34 In the context of public health, the compulsory licensing provision is intended to permit countries to produce or import generic drugs that are more affordable than
patented medications.35 Because the provision is an exception to the exclusive rights of the patent holder, the use of the provision is restricted by
a number of conditions aimed at protecting the rights of the patent
holder.36
The WTO has explicitly stated that each member nation has the freedom to determine the grounds upon which compulsory licenses may be
granted.37 Article 31 lists several non-exclusive grounds for granting a
compulsory license: national emergency or extreme urgency; public noncommercial use;38 and remedy to anti-competitive practices.39 Although
article 31 specifically mentions several grounds for issuing a license, it
must be stressed that this list is not exclusive and it does not limit a
member’s right to issue compulsory licenses based on other grounds.40
However, the grant of a compulsory license on frivolous grounds, such
as the individual interest of a competitor, is not a legitimate ground for
granting a compulsory license because compulsory licenses are exceptions to patent rights and, as such, may only be used in exceptional circumstances.41

33. TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET, supra note 32, at 4.
34. Id.
35. CORREA, supra note 25, at 313–14.
36. TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET, supra note 32, at 4.
37. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 5(b) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2
[hereinafter Doha Declaration].
38. “Public non-commercial use,” otherwise known as “government use,” is an act by
the government of a member nation to exploit by itself or through the use of a private
contractor a patented invention without consent of the patent owner. CORREA, supra note
25, at 316.
39. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 31.
40. CARLOS M. CORREA, PATENT RIGHTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 189, 210 (1998).
41. NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 232 (2002).
The compulsory licensing provision should be read together with the related provisions of
article 27(1) which requires member countries to make patents available for any inventions, including products or processes, and subject to the normal tests of novelty, inventiveness, and industrial applicability. See Overview of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note
18. Article 27(1) also requires that patents be enjoyed without discrimination as to the
place where they were invented and whether the product is produced locally or imported.
Id.
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Although the TRIPS agreement is flexible regarding the grounds for issuing a compulsory license, the agreement subjects such licenses to a
detailed list of conditions. Article 31(b) requires a country applying for a
license to first attempt to negotiate a voluntary license from the patent
holder under reasonable commercial terms and for a reasonable period of
time.42 However, in situations of national emergencies, other circumstances of extreme urgency, or in cases of public non-commercial use,
there is no need to try to negotiate for a voluntary license.43 Additionally,
under the compulsory license, adequate remuneration must still be paid
to the patent holder taking into account the economic value of the authorization in each case.44 The scope and duration of the use of the compulsory license is “limited to the purpose for which it was authorized”45
and authorization of such use can be terminated “if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to recur.”46 Furthermore, article 31(f) states that a compulsory license shall be authorized “predominately for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use.”47 This condition has the practical effect of preventing export of generic drugs to countries that do not have sufficient
pharmaceutical industries to produce the drugs themselves.48
In November 2001, the WTO nations held the Doha Ministerial Conference (“Doha Declaration”) in order to clarify the terms and intention
of the compulsory licensing provision.49 This conference resulted in the
Doha Declaration. The Doha Declaration stressed that the TRIPS agreement should be interpreted and implemented in such a manner so as to
promote public health.50 The Declaration affirmed the government’s right
to use the agreement’s flexibilities, such as compulsory licensing, in order to protect public health and also clarified some of the grounds for
granting a compulsory license.51 It stated that each member has the right
42. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 31(b).
43. Id.
44. Id. art. 31(h).
45. Id. art. 31(c).
46. Id. art. 31(g).
47. Id. art. 31(f).
48. CORREA, supra note 25, at 321.
49. See generally Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS
Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 964–66 (2000)
(discussing the wide range of interpretations that developing and developed countries
attach to the language in article 31).
50. Doha Declaration, supra note 37, ¶ 4.
51. See Divya Murthy, The Future of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1299,
1305 (2002) (noting that the ministerial text of the Doha Declaration intended to address
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to determine what constitutes a “national emergency” or “other circumstance of extreme urgency” and that public crisis such as HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics, can present such circumstances.52
In addition, the Declaration recognized that some WTO members with
insufficient manufacturing capacities were having difficulties making use
of the compulsory licensing provision and instructed the Council for
TRIPS to find an “expeditious solution to this problem.”53 On August 30,
2003, in response to the Doha Declaration, WTO members adopted an
amendment that solved the legal problem for exporting countries.54 The
August 30 Decision waived exporting countries’ obligations under article
31(f).55 Under this waiver, any member country may export generic
pharmaceuticals made under compulsory licenses to meet the needs of
importing countries that lack manufacturing capacity to make the drug.56
For many years, compulsory licensing was typically used as a bargaining tool for developing countries in their negotiations with pharmaceutical companies.57 However, after the Doha Declaration in 2002, developtwo issues: the scope of the term “public health” and the ability of nations without adequate manufacturing capacities to seek the benefits of compulsory licensing).
52. Doha Declaration, supra note 37, ¶ 5(c). The declaration also clarified what the
grounds are for granting a compulsory license by stating that “each Member has the right
to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including those related to
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” Id.
53. Id. ¶ 6.
54. TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET, supra note 32, at 6.
55. Id.
56. Id. This waiver is itself subject to several conditions. The importing member must
notify the TRIPS Council of the type and quantity of licensed product, and, except in the
case of a least developed country, the importing member must establish a lack of manufacturing capacity to produce the drug. WTO, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Decision of 30 August 2003, ¶
2(c), WT/L/540, http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/540.doc (Sept. 2,
2003) [hereinafter August 30 Decision]. It is unclear what a member must do in order to
establish “lack of manufacturing capacity.” The Annex of the Decision sets out two alternatives: (1) the member has established that it has no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector; or (2) the member has some manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector but it is currently insufficient to meet its needs. Id. In addition, in order to
prevent the emergence of a black market through re-exportation of the generic drug, the
Decision requires that the generic drug must be clearly distinguished through specific
labeling, packaging, or product coloring. Id. ¶ 2. Finally, the responsibility of “adequate
remuneration” to the patent holder is still applicable although it only extends to the exporting member. Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
57. Consumer Tech, supra note 11.
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ing countries began utilizing the provision in order to obtain generic versions of HIV/AIDS medication.58 In 2004, Malaysia and Indonesia became the first middle income countries to issue compulsory licenses for
the importation of HIV/AIDS medications.59 In 2006, amidst much controversy, Thailand issued a compulsory license for importation of the
generic version of Efravinez, an HIV/AIDS medication.60 In the beginning of 2007, Thailand announced that it would issue two more compulsory licenses for the HIV/AIDS drug Kaletra and the heart disease drug
Plavix.61 Then, on May 4, 2007, for the first time in Brazil’s history,
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva signed a decree issuing a compulsory
license for the Merck owned HIV/AIDS drug Efavirenez.62
III. THE RECENT CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE DISPUTE BETWEEN
BRAZIL AND MERCK
A. About Brazil’s HIV/AIDS Program
In order to better understand the recent controversy surrounding Brazil’s actions, it is necessary to consider the factual background of the
AIDS epidemic in Brazil. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(“AIDS”) is caused by the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (“HIV”).63
First recognized in 1981, AIDS has since become a worldwide pandemic.64 HIV kills or damages cells in the body’s immune system caus58. Id. After the Doha Declaration in 2002, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Zambia
became the first developing nations to issue a compulsory license for the production of
Antiretroviral drugs (“ARVs”). Id. In 2005, three more low income countries issued a
compulsory license for the importations of generic ARVs (Cameroon, Eritrea, and
Ghana). Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. On November 29, 2006, Thailand’s Ministry of Health, without prior negotiations with Efavirenz’s producer Merck, declared that it would issue a compulsory license
for the importation of Efavirenz from India and pay Merck a royalty rate of 0.5%. Brook
K. Baker, Price Cut Hand-Cuffs: Thailand Must Stand Up to Merck, IP-HEALTH, Dec. 3,
2006, http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2006-December/010273.html.
61. Consumer Tech, supra note 11. On January 25, 2007, Thailand announced that it
would issue compulsory licenses for Kaletra and Plavix. Id. The royalty rate to the patent
holder under both licenses was 0.5%. Id. In addition, the Plavix license does not have a
specific expiration date and will last until the patent has expired or there is no essential
need. Id.
62. BNA Report, supra note 1.
63. See Nat’l Inst. of Health, HIV Infection and AIDS: An Overview,
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/hivinf.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2007) [hereinafter
NIH Fact Sheet].
64. Id. In 2006, there were approximately 39.5 million people living with the HIV
virus worldwide and approximately 4.3 million new infections. UNAIDS, AIDS
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ing sickness and death from illnesses that normally do not make healthy
people sick.65 Antiretroviral drugs (“ARVs”) have been developed to
disrupt the progress of HIV.66 ARVs have been proven to be effective at
combating the virus but they are not a cure.67 A person taking ARVs
must take them for life because if treatment is stopped, the virus will become active again.68
But the AIDS epidemic continues to devastate many developing countries.69 Approximately 24.7 million people are infected with HIV in SubSaharan Africa, compared with 1.4 million people in North America.70
So while the new drugs have lowered the rate of HIV infection in developed countries, the high cost of these drugs is not affordable for most
people living with HIV/AIDS in developing countries.71 The local production or importation of generic drugs could lower the price of essential
medication, making the drugs affordable for people in developing nations.72 A strong international patent system exacerbates the lack of access problem for developing nations by inhibiting developing nations

EPIDEMIC UPDATE 1, UNAIDS/06.29E (2006), available at http://data.unaids.org
/pub/EpiReport/2006/2006_EpiUpdate_en.pdf [hereinafter UNAIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE].
65. NIH Fact Sheet, supra note 63.
66. UNAIDS: Policy and Practice—HIV Treatment, http://www.unaids.org/en/Policy
AndPractice/HIVTreatment/default.asp (last visited June 06, 2008).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. UNAIDS, REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6,
UNAIDS/06.20E (2006), available at http://data.unaids.org/pub/GlobalReport/2006/
2006_GR-ExecutiveSummary_en.pdf. “Africa remains the global epicenter of the AIDS
pandemic. South Africa’s AIDS epidemic—one of the worst in the world—shows no
evidence of a decline.” Id.
70. UNAIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 64, at 65 (providing a global map of the
number of people infected with HIV in different regions of the world).
71. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], PROGRESS REPORT: TOWARDS
UNIVERSAL ACCESS—SCALING UP PRIORITY HIV/AIDS INTERVENTIONS IN THE HEALTH
SECTOR 21 (2007), available at http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2007/20070925
_oms_progress_report_en.pdf [hereinafter WHO PROGRESS REPORT]. Between 2003 and
2005, the price of first-line ARVs has decreased between 37–53% in low and middle
income countries. Id. at 6. Between 2005 and 2006, the price has decreased an additional
10–20%. Id. However, the average prices paid for second line regimens remain unaffordably high in low and middle income countries where few generic alternatives are available. Id. at 21. In 2006, the most commonly used second-line regimen cost $1698 in lowincome countries and $4735 in middle-income countries. Id. at 22–23.
72. John A. Harrelson, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis:
Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 175, 177 (2001) (discussing the proper level of patent protection for
pharmaceuticals in developing countries).
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from buying the cheaper generic versions of the drug as a result of the
patent owner’s exclusive rights to make and sell the drug.73
Brazil is home to approximately one third of the total population of
people infected with HIV/AIDS living in Latin America.74 Started in
1997, Brazil’s highly praised anti-AIDS program provides free treatment
to approximately 180,000 HIV/AIDS patients and has been credited for
keeping the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Latin America under control.75 Brazil’s provision of antiretroviral therapy is among the most comprehensive
in the world and, according to the Joint United Nations Program on
HIV/AIDS (“UNAIDS”), it has been yielding positive results.76 Brazil’s
success in providing access to HIV/AIDS medication to its citizens has
been attributed to “governmental commitment, the reduced cost of pharmaceuticals made possible by domestic manufacture of generic drugs,
and negotiated price discounts for other drugs.”77
In furthering its campaign to provide affordable HIV/AIDS treatment,
Brazil has used the threat of issuing a compulsory license as a means of
negotiating lower prices with drug companies.78 In 2001, Merck responded to Brazil’s recent threat to issue a compulsory license by reducing the price of Stocrin, an HIV/AIDS medication.79 In August of the
same year, Swiss pharmaceutical company Roche also agreed to lower
the price of its AIDS-fighting drug Viracept by forty percent, in response
73. Id. at 175–78.
74. UNAIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 64, at 48. In 2005, there was a total of 1.7
million people living with HIV in Latin America. Id. At the end of 2006, around 180,000
of the 210,000 people in need of ARVs in Brazil were receiving them. WHO PROGRESS
REPORT, supra note 71, at 64.
75. BNA Report, supra note 1.
76. UNAIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE, supra note 64, at 49. Mother-to-child transmission
of HIV declined from 16% in 1997 to less than 4% in 2002. Id. Between 1996 and 2002,
AIDS mortality rates decreased by 50%, and AIDS-related hospitalizations dropped by
80% during the same period. Id. UNAIDS has praised Brazil by stating that “Brazil’s
dual emphasis on prevention and treatment has helped to keep its HIV epidemic under
control.” Id.
77. Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options Under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103, 129 (2003). For
example, between 1997 and 2001, the estimated annual cost of HIV therapy in Brazil has
fallen from $7858 per person to $4137 per person. Id. This is at least two times lower
than the cost of HIV therapy in the United States, which costs between $10,000 and
$15,000 per patient per year. Id.
78. Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries
Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 191, 209–10 (2002).
79. Id. at 209. In March 2001, Merck agreed to lower the prices of Indinavir and
Efavirenz by 65% and 59%. In return, Brazil cancelled its plan to authorize generic production of the drugs. See Consumer Tech, supra note 11.
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to Brazil’s threat to issue a compulsory license.80 Similarly, in 2003,
Merck agreed to lower the price of ARV Kaletra after Brazil’s threat to
issue a compulsory license for the drug.81 This pattern of threats and negotiations clearly demonstrates that Brazil’s threats to issue compulsory
licenses for HIV/AIDS medications have resulted in lowering the costs
of many essential drugs for the government’s HIV/AIDS program.
B. The Recent Controversy: Brazil and Merck
Despite Brazil’s previous success in negotiating with pharmaceutical
companies, the cost of Brazil’s HIV/AIDS program has almost doubled
in the last several years,82 partially due to the increased demand for second-line HIV/AIDS medication.83 At current prices, the annual cost of
Merck’s Efavirenz for the Brazilian government was $42 million, at
$1.59 per pill.84 Brazil’s health ministry claimed that they could import a
generic version of the drug from India at a price of $0.45 per pill.85 Since
2006, Brazil’s Ministry of Health has attempted to negotiate with Merck
for a price reduction.86 Brazil stated that it wanted to pay the price for the
drug that Merck currently offered to countries in similar income levels as
80. Bass, supra note 78, at 209. After unsuccessful negotiations over the price of the
ARV Nelfinavir (sold under the brand name Viracept by Roche), Brazil’s Health Minister
announced that his country will issue a compulsory license for the local production of the
generic version of the drug. See Consumer Tech, supra note 11. Nine days later, Roche
and Brazil reached an agreement for a 40% reduction in the price of the drug in exchange
for Brazil not issuing the compulsory license. Id.
81. Id.
82. BNA Report, supra note 1. The cost of the program has increased from $247.5
million to $445.5 million during the last several years. Id.
83. Medecines Sans Frontieres, The Second-line AIDS Crisis: Condemned to Repeat?,
MSF ARTICLE, Apr. 13, 2007, http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?
component=article&objectid=65D58C38-15C5-F00A25DE21CB571D3E0E&method=
full_html [hereinafter MSF Article]. “While the needs for second-line regimens are likely
to increase in the coming years, medicines used for second-line therapy are mostly unavailable or unaffordable in developing countries.” Id.
84. BNA Report, supra note 1. According to the World Health Organization
(“WHO”), Efavirenz is one the drugs used in the newly-recommended first-line ARV
regimen for adults and adolescents. WHO, SOURCES AND PRICES OF SELECTED MEDICINES
AND DIAGNOSTICS FOR PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS 5, WHO/EDM/PAR/2004.4 (2004),
available at http://data.unaids.org/Publications/IRC-pub02/jc645-sources_prices_en.pdf.
Currently, 38% of patients take the drug and it is estimated that by the end of 2007,
75,000 of the 200,000 patients currently on antiretroviral treatment in Brazil will be taking Efavirenz. Posting, Brazilian Government Declares Efavirenz to be of Public Interest,
gabriela@abiaids.org.br, to EssentialDrugs.org (Apr. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Essential
Drugs].
85. BNA Report, supra note 1.
86. Essential Drugs, supra note 84.
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Brazil.87 On April 25, 2007, Brazil took the first step in the compulsory
licensing process by declaring Efavirenz in “the public interest.”88 After
the Health Ministry rejected Merck’s offer of $1.10 per pill, the Brazilian
government took the final step in its compulsory licensing process by
issuing a license to import the generic version of the drug from India
while paying Merck royalties of 1.5%.89 The government claimed that
the generic drug would permit an annual savings of $30 million on their
anti-AIDS program.90 In justifying this unprecedented action, Brazil’s
president stated that he was not willing to sacrifice the health of his
country’s citizens for the sake of world trade.91
IV. ANALYZING BRAZIL’S RESPONSE
A. Brazil’s Actions are Valid Under the Compulsory Licensing Provision
If Merck challenges the legal validity of Brazil’s actions under the
compulsory licensing provision, the United States may take the dispute
in front of the WTO’s international panel, the Dispute Settlement Body
(“DSB”), which is responsible for settling disputes between Member nations.92 In determining whether Brazil’s actions are valid under the com87. Press Release, Brazil Ministry of Health, Efavirenz: Questions About Compulsory
Licensing (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.aids.gov.br/data/Pages/LUMISE77B47C8ITE
MID74BBB449C36442B9B92D6ACC1D9DFC21ENIE.htm [hereinafter Brazil Health
Web site—Efavirenz]. Brazil stated that the cost of the Merck’s Efavirenz is 136% higher
in Brazil than in Thailand and that it would accept the same price offered to Thailand. Id.
88. Essential Drugs, supra note 83. Brazil’s compulsory licensing provision entails
three steps: (1) declare in a decree that the product in question is “in the public interest”;
(2) the government is required to negotiate with the company to see if a mutually acceptable price can be reached; (3) the government will issue another decree if the negotiations
fail and it decides to issue a compulsory license. Posting of Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen,
tgerhardsen@ip-watch.ch, to IP-Watch.org (May 4, 2007), available at http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/index.php?p=614&res=1280&print=0.
89. BNA Report, supra note 1.
90. Id.
91. Id. “Between our trade and our health, we are going to take care of our health. It is
not possible for someone to get rich from the misfortune of others.” Id.
92. WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO—SETTLING DISPUTES 56 (2007),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm#understanding_chapter
(download Chapter 3: Settling Disputes for pdf version). Disputes arise under the TRIPS
agreement when one country adopts a trade policy that another WTO Member believes to
be violating the agreement. Id. at 55. The Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”), composed
of all WTO Members, is responsible for setting up panels to consider the case. Id. at 56.
The decision of the panel is subject to review by a permanent appellate body. Id. Once a
case has been decided, the losing “defendant” must conform its policy to the ruling of the
panel. Id. at 58. If the losing party fails to conform to these rules, a suitable penalty, such
as a sanction or tariff, may be imposed. Id. The DSB has never heard a case involving a
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pulsory licensing provision of the TRIPS agreement, the DSB must first
determine if Brazil has satisfied the conditions of the compulsory licensing provision which restrict its use.
The DSB will most likely find that Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision is valid for three main reasons. First, Brazil has sought
prior negotiation with the patent holder Merck and thus satisfies the condition under article 31(b) requiring “reasonable” negotiation with the
patent holder. Second, even if Brazil’s negotiations with Merck are not
considered reasonable, Brazil actions are valid under either the national
emergency or the public non-commercial use exceptions of article 31(b),
which waive the reasonable negotiating requirement. Finally, Brazil’s
use of the provision is valid because Brazil may import the generic
Efravinez from India under the waiver of article 31(f) provided by the
August 30 Decision.
(i) Prior Reasonable Negotiation Requirement Under Article 31(b)
The compulsory licensing provision is ambiguous about many of the
conditions and grounds for issuing a license, thus leaving the provision
open to different interpretations. First, article 31(b) states that unless the
license is granted for a national emergency, other circumstance of extreme urgency, or a public non-commercial use, the member must have
previously attempted to negotiate with the patent owner under reasonable
commercial terms and that such efforts have not been successful within a
reasonable period of time.93 However, what is considered “reasonable”
under this provision is not defined and has been left to national laws.94
For example, a reasonable period of time has been considered anywhere
between 90 days and 6 months.95 Although the United States may argue
that Brazil has not attempted to negotiate for a reasonable period of time,
this argument is not likely to be successful because prior to issuing the
license, Brazil had negotiated with Merck for two years over the price of
Efavirenz.96
In arguing that Brazil did not negotiate under “reasonable commercial
terms,” the United States may point out that Brazil consistently refused
Merck’s offers which were based on fair terms. 97 However, Merck’s ofchallenge to a country’s use of the compulsory licensing provision. Consumer Tech, supra note 11.
93. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 31(b).
94. CORREA, supra note 25, at 320.
95. CARVALHO, supra note 41, at 234.
96. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO: THE AGREEMENTS, supra note 4.
97. Gerhardsen, supra note 88. On a practical level, Merck has argued that the price
of Efavirenz in Brazil is fair. Merck Statement, supra note 13. Merck bases its HIV pric-
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fers were not fair in this instance because its pricing scheme disregarded
extremely relevant factors, such as the extent of the country’s population
needing treatment and the actual number of patients currently being
treated with the drug.98 For example, the cost of Efavirenz is 136%
higher in Brazil than in Thailand, a country of comparable income
level.99 In addition, approximately 75,000 people are taking Efavirenz in
Brazil, while in Thailand only 17,000 people are taking the drug.100 During negotiations, Brazil informed Merck that it would accept a price the
same price offered to Thailand, namely $0.65 per tablet.101 However, the
lowest price Merck offered to Brazil was $1.10 per tablet.102 Thus,
Merck’s reduced price offers were not consistent with the international
pricing scheme for the drug and cannot be considered fair.
In response, the United States may argue that Brazil’s repeated use of
the compulsory licensing provision as a bargaining tool does not qualify
as negotiating under reasonable commercial terms.103 It will argue that by
threatening to issue a compulsory license during negotiations with pharmaceutical companies, Brazil was not bargaining under reasonable
commercial terms. Brazil may respond by arguing that the threat of issuing a compulsory license has provided a tactical advantage in prior negotiations and did not prevent successful agreements with pharmaceutical
companies.104 Thus, Brazil will argue that threatening to issue a compulsory license during negotiations qualifies as negotiating under reasonable
commercial terms. It is unclear whether the DSB will consider the threat
of using the provision as bargaining under reasonable commercial terms.
However, the DSB will find that under the national emergency or the
public non-commercial use exception of 31(b), the requirement to bargain under reasonable commercial terms has been waived.

ing policy on the comparable wealth and disease burden of the country. Id. Brazil is the
world’s twelfth largest economy and has a much lower rate of infection than many countries at its income level. Id. Thus Brazil has a greater capacity to pay for HIV/AIDS
medicines than countries that are poorer or harder hit by the disease. Id.
98. Brazil Health Web site—Efavirenz, supra note 87.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. BNA Report, supra note 1.
103. See Consumer Tech, supra note 11 (citing examples of Brazil’s threats to issue a
compulsory license that resulted in lower drug prices).
104. Consumer Tech, supra note 11. Until the current dispute with Merck, the pharmaceutical companies have reacted positively to Brazil’s threats to issue a compulsory license by lowering prices and reaching an agreement with Brazil. Id.
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(ii) The National Emergency and Public Non-Commercial Use Exceptions Under Article 31(b)
The requirement of reasonable prior negotiations with the patent holder
under article 31(b)105 is waived because Brazil’s compulsory license falls
under both the national emergency and public non-commercial use exceptions to article 31(b).
Brazil’s compulsory license falls under the national emergency exception to article 31(b) and thus Brazil was not required to negotiate with
Merck prior to issuing the license. Brazil’s compulsory license was issued for an HIV/AIDS medication.106 The WTO has explicitly stated that
HIV/AIDS can qualify as a national emergency. 107 Thus, Brazil’s use of
the provision falls under the national emergency exception because
Efavirenz will be used in the government’s HIV/AIDS program.108
The United States may argue that although the WTO has stated that
AIDS “can” constitute a national emergency or other circumstance of
extreme urgency, this does not necessarily mean that Brazil’s AIDS epidemic actually does constitute such circumstances. In fact, the United
States will point out that Brazil’s rate of infection is much lower than in
many countries, thus bolstering its argument that Brazil’s AIDS epidemic
does not qualify as a national emergency.109 However, an important reason for Brazil’s low rate of infection is the country’s ability to obtain
affordable medicine, either through negotiations with pharmaceutical
companies or through actual use of the compulsory licensing provision.110 In addition, the WTO has avoided a clear declaration of what is
considered a national emergency and has explicitly stated that each country must decide for itself the conditions of a national emergency.111 This
demonstrates that the DSB is unlikely to require that a country be

105. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 31(b).
106. See BNA Report, supra note 1.
107. See Doha Declaration, supra note 37, ¶ 5(c).
108. See BNA Report, supra note 1.
109. Ubiraja Regis Quintanilha Marques, Valesak Santos Guimaraes & Caitlin Sternberg, Brazil’s AIDS Controversy: Antiretroviral Drugs, Breaking Patents, and Compulsory Licensing, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 471, 471 (2005). As a result of Brazil’s extensive
anti-AIDS program, only about 600,000 Brazilians are infected with the disease. Id. This
is less than one percent of the adult population. Id.
110. Lazzarini, supra note 77, at 129. Brazil’s success in providing access to AIDS
medication to its citizens has been attributed to “governmental commitment, the reduced
cost of pharmaceuticals made possible by domestic manufacture of generic drugs, and
negotiated price discounts for other drugs.” Id.
111. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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“steeped in disease”112 before it can invoke the national emergency exception under article 31(b). Thus, under the national emergency exception, Brazil was not required to engage in reasonable negotiations with
Merck prior to issuing the license.
Furthermore, Brazil was not required to negotiate with Merck before
issuing the license because Brazil’s compulsory license falls under the
public non-commercial use exception to 31(b).113 Prior to issuing the license, Brazil’s government declared Efavirenz to be in the “public interest” in light of the need to ensure the viability of the government’s
HIV/AIDS treatment program.114 Thus, the license was granted for a
public non-commercial use because Efavirenz is part of the Brazilian
government’s HIV/AIDS program.115 The United States will counter that
Brazil’s use of the provision is not a public non-commercial use because
the government is importing the generic drug from a private Indian
manufacturer.116 However, the non-commercial nature of the use does
not prevent the government from hiring a commercial contractor to actually exploit the patents on behalf of the government.117 Thus, Brazil’s
actions are valid under the public non-commercial use exception in article 31(b).
(iii) Conditions of Compulsory Licensing Under Article 31(f) and the
August 30 Decision
The most contentious aspect of the validity of Brazil’s actions under
article 31 is Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision to import
generic Efavirenz from India.118 Although the August 30 Decision allows
countries to import generic drugs by waiving article 31(f) of the compulsory licensing provision, the August 30 Decision requires that the importing country establish a lack of manufacturing capacity.119 The United
States will argue that Brazil cannot establish a lack of manufacturing capacity because the country is itself a major producer of generic drugs.120
112. Jennifer Bjornberg, Brazil’s Recent Threat on Abbott’s Patent: Resolution or
Retaliation?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 218 (2006).
113. See CORREA, supra note 25, at 316 (describing the public non-commercial use
exception in article 31).
114. See Essential Drugs, supra note 84.
115. See Essential Drugs, supra note 84.
116. BNA Report, supra note 1.
117. CORREA, supra note 25, at 317.
118. See BNA Report, supra note 1.
119. See TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET, supra note 32, at 6.
120. MARQUES ET. AL., supra note 109, at 473. Eight of the sixteen ARVs used in the
anti-AIDS cocktails provided by the Brazilian government are manufactured in Brazil. Id.
Compulsory licenses are not needed for these drugs because Brazil began to manufacture
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However, the August 30 Decision does not require a country to demonstrate that it has no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector.121 In fact, a lack of manufacturing capacity may also mean that a
country has some manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector
but that it is currently insufficient to meet its needs.122 Thus Brazil may
argue that it has established a lack of manufacturing capacity to produce
generic Efavirenz because its pharmaceutical laboratories are currently
unable to produce a safe generic version of the drug. In order to ensure
the quality, safety, and effectiveness of the generic drug, Brazil will only
use generics produced from laboratories that are pre-qualified by the
World Health Organization (“WHO”).123 Currently, all the laboratories
producing generic Efavirenz that are WHO pre-qualified are located in
India.124 Thus, Brazil currently lacks manufacturing capacity to produce
generic Efavirenz because its laboratories are not WHO pre-qualified to
produce the drug.
(iv) Brazil’s Compulsory License for Efavirenz is Valid Under Article 31
As this dispute demonstrates, there are many undefined and ambiguous
terms in the compulsory licensing provision, which leave it open to different interpretations. So far, only a handful of countries have utilized the
provision in the context of pharmaceuticals125 and the DSB has yet to
resolve a dispute resulting from the use of article 31 to import or produce
generic HIV/AIDS drugs.126 If the United States challenges Brazil’s use

these drugs before Brazil was forced to recognize patents for pharmaceutical drugs under
the TRIPS agreement. Id.
121. See TRIPS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: FACT SHEET, supra note 32, at 6.
122. Id.
123. Press Release, Brazil Ministry of Health, Treatment of AIDS: Brazil Issues Compulsory License for Efavirenz (May 4, 2007) http://www.aids.gov.br/data/Pages/
LUMISCEBD192AENIE.htm (click on “More National Programme News,” go to page
3) [hereinafter Brazil Health Web site—Treatment of AIDS]. The WHO’s prequalification program lists manufacturers and suppliers whose HIV-related medicines
have been found acceptable for procurement by U.N. agencies. WHO, PREQUALIFICATION
PROGRAMME: ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2007), available at
http://healthtech.who.int/pq/default.htm (click on Annual Report 2007 under quick-links
on the right side).
124. Brazil Health Web site—Treatment of AIDS, supra note 123. See also WHO,
PRE-QUALIFICATION PROGRAMME: ACCESS TO HIV/AIDS DRUGS AND DIAGNOSTICS OF
ACCEPTABLE QUALITY 3–4 (2007), available at http://healthtech.who.int/pq/ (click on
pdf).
125. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
126. WTO, Dispute Settlement: Index of Dispute Issues, http://www.wto.org/english/tra
top_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#trips (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). There have
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of the compulsory licensing provision, the DSB will most likely find that
Brazil’s recent actions are valid under article 31. Ultimately though, how
this dispute is resolved in front of the DSB will create important precedent by defining many of the ambiguities in the compulsory licensing
provision. The resolution of the DSB will be an important factor in determining if and how this provision will be used in the future.
B. Brazil’s Actions Set Good Policy for the Future Use of the Compulsory Licensing Provision
In justifying his country’s unprecedented use of the compulsory licensing provision, Brazil’s president stated that he was not willing to sacrifice the health of his country’s citizens for the sake of world trade.127
This statement reflects the concern of many developing nations that
strong intellectual property rights over pharmaceuticals prevents impoverished people from having access to life-saving medication. By allowing
generic manufacturers to override the patent holder’s rights, compulsory
licensing provides a flexible and direct means for the rapid development
of generics.128 The introduction of generics creates competition in the
pharmaceutical market and has been proven to reduce the cost of medicine.129 The effect of the compulsory licensing provision to lower drug
prices is demonstrated in Brazil. By using the compulsory licensing provision to import generic Efavirenz from India, the Brazilian government
is saving $30 million annually on their anti-AIDS program.130 Thus, by
lowering drug prices, compulsory licenses allow countries to provide
greater access to medicines for their citizens.
However, the pharmaceutical industry’s response to Brazil’s issuance
of a compulsory license has been extremely negative. Merck has stated
that it is “profoundly disappointed” by the decision of the Brazilian government to issue a compulsory license for Efavirenz131 and considers the
only been two complaints filed with the DSB relating to pharmaceuticals. Id. Neither of
these complaints involve the use of compulsory licenses. Id.
127. BNA Report, supra note 1. “Between our trade and our health, we are going to
take care of our health. It is not possible for someone to get rich from the misfortune of
others.” Id.
128. Weissman, supra note 7, at 1116–20.
129. Id. “The empirical evidence in support of the price-reducing effects of the introduction of generics is overwhelming.” Id. at 117. Empirical studies reveal that patents are
a major factor in sustaining high drug prices and the introduction of generics lowers drug
prices to the production costs. Id.
130. BNA Report, supra note 1.
131. Merck Statement, supra note 13. The company says that it had attempted to negotiate in good faith with Brazil and remains flexible and committed to reaching a mutually
acceptable agreement with the Brazilian government. Id.
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recent actions of Brazil to be a “major step backward.”132 Merck maintains that Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision does not set
good policy for two reasons. First, Merck argues that Brazil’s use of the
provision sets bad precedent because it will encourage overuse of the
provision, which will have a “chilling effect” on the R&D incentives of
pharmaceutical companies. Second, Merck argues that Brazil’s use of the
provision will discourage foreign investment and that it may deter pharmaceutical companies from introducing new life-saving drugs in Brazil.
Merck’s first argument is that by overriding the exclusive rights of the
patent holder to produce and sell the drug, Brazil “sends a chilling signal” to pharmaceutical companies who develop life-saving drugs for diseases that afflict the developing world.133 Research and development is a
costly and risky process.134 Pharmaceutical companies rely on patent protection in order to recoup a premium for the high research and development costs in creating a new drug.135 By breaking patents where it is not
absolutely necessary, developing countries may be discouraging pharmaceutical companies from creating new life-saving medications.
This argument is particularly relevant in the case of Brazil. Brazil is
classified as an “upper-middle income country” and is the twelfth largest
economy in the world.136 In addition, Brazil has a very successful
HIV/AIDS program and has been able to control the spread of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic within its borders.137 In this way, Brazil appears to
132. Brazil Issues Compulsory License for AIDS Drug, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS
DIGEST, May 9, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-05-09/story4.htm.
133. Merck Statement, supra note 13.
134. PhRMA Press Release, supra note 13. Last year alone, the U.S. pharmaceutical
industry invested $55 billion on research and development [“R&D”] of new medications.
Id. Currently, there are seventy-seven medicines and vaccines being developed for
HIV/AIDS. Id. See also Bruce Lehman & Michael Einhorn, Intellectual Property and
Compulsory Licensing: Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World (on file with author).
“The research process for new drugs is daunting.” Id. at 4. The development of new drugs
averages 15 years. Id. There is a high risk of failure and “most efforts at innovation fail.”
Id. at 5. The average new drug costs up to $800 million to develop, while the generic
version costs under two million. Id.
135. PhRMA press release, supra note 13. See also Lehman & Einhorn, supra note
134. Several studies have confirmed the correlation between patent protection and R&D.
Id. at 5. In fact, one study concluded that 60 percent of drug inventions in a representative
time period would not have been developed without patent protection. Id.
136. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Rank Order—
GDP, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank
.html (last visited May 30, 2008).
137. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Rank Order—HIV/AIDS
Adult Prevalence Rate, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook
/rankorder/2155rank.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). The rate of adult HIV/AIDS infec-
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be in a much less desperate situation than many countries who suffer not
only from high rates of HIV/AIDS infection, but also from floundering
economies and infrastructure. Because Brazil is a relatively wealthy nation and has been successful in controlling the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it
may be argued that Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision is
not appropriate because it is not necessary. The use of the compulsory
licensing provision where it is not absolutely necessary may lead countries down a slippery slope to overuse the provision, thereby discouraging R&D by pharmaceutical companies. Thus, Brazil sets a negative example for how the compulsory licensing provision should be used by
encouraging overuse of the provision and thereby disincentivising the
R&D of new life-saving medications.
However, although strong patent protection may impede R&D by
pharmaceutical companies, this claim has been exaggerated, especially in
the context of developing countries. Pharmaceutical companies, driven
by profits, invest most of their money in researching drugs for diseases
that afflict developed nations.138 For example, twenty-one percent of the
global disease burden139 comes from malaria, pneumonia, diarrhea, and
tuberculosis.140 However, these diseases received less than one percent of
all public and private investment in health research.141 A recent report
from the British Government’s Commission on Intellectual Property

tion in Brazil in 2003 was 0.70%, compared with the rate in the United States of 0.60%.
Id.
138. Joseph Stiglitz, Dying in the Name of Monopoly, BUSINESS DAY, Mar. 9, 2007,
available at http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A407148. See
also GLOBAL FORUM FOR HEALTH RESEARCH THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH
2003–2004, at 122–23 (2004), http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Site/002__What%20
we%20do/005__Publications/001__10%2090%20reports.php (click on chapter 5) [hereinafter THE 10/90 REPORT]. Data on the site shows that the most dangerous and widespread diseases receive the least percentage of total investment in health research. Id. The
global disease burden combines death, morbidity, and disability in one figure to create an
effective measuring tool for measuring conditions that are not on the priority list. Global
Forum for Health Research, The 10/90 Gap: Themes–Burden of Disease, available at
http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Site/003__The%2010%2090%20gap/003__Themes/0
01__Burden%20of%20disease.php [hereinafter Themes—Burden of Disease].
139. The global disease burden combines death, morbidity, and disability in one figure
to create an effective measuring tool for measuring conditions that are not on the priority
list. Global Forum for Health Research, The 10/90 Gap: Themes–Burden of Disease,
available at http://www.globalforumhealth.org/Site/003__The%2010%2090%20gap/003
__Themes/001__Burden%20of%20disease.php [hereinafter Themes—Burden of Disease].
140. THE 10/90 REPORT, supra note 138, at 122. These diseases have an overwhelming
or exclusive incidence in poor countries. Id. at 123.
141. Id. at 122.
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Rights found that “the IP system hardly plays any role in stimulating research on diseases particularly prevalent in developing countries, except
for those diseases where there is also a substantial market in the developed world.”142 This demonstrates that the patent protection provided in
developing countries does not heavily contribute to the incentives of
pharmaceutical companies for research and development because pharmaceutical companies are investing in drugs primarily for the benefit of
developed countries.
Moreover, Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision was appropriate because it is necessary for Brazil to use the compulsory licensing provision in order to maintain its successful HIV/AIDS program. The
cost of Brazil’s HIV/AIDS program is rising, partially due to the high
cots of second-line HIV/AIDS medication.143 In addition, an important
part of Brazil’s success in its HIV/AIDS program is due to Brazil’s ability to bargain for lower prices with pharmaceutical companies by threatening to issue a compulsory license.144 By utilizing the compulsory licensing provision after repeated threats to do so, Brazil sends a clear
message to pharmaceutical companies that it is serious about the health
of its citizens.
Secondly, Merck argues that Brazil’s actions will have a negative impact on “Brazil’s reputation as an industrialized country” seeking to attract foreign investment.145 This is because pharmaceutical companies
may cease investing and introducing new drugs in countries where the
compulsory licensing provision has been invoked and where the government of these countries does not provide sufficient protection of intellectual property rights. This argument is especially relevant in light of the
recent dispute between Abbott Laboratories and Thailand. During the
past year, Thailand issued compulsory licenses for the anti-retroviral
drugs Efavirenz and Kaletra and for the heart disease medication
Plavix.146 The Thai government engaged in limited negotiations with
pharmaceutical companies prior to issuing the licenses, claiming that
prior negotiation with pharmaceutical companies is not an effective
142. COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENTAL POLICY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13 (2002),
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPR_Exec_Sumfinal.pdf.
143. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
145. Merck Statement, supra note 13.
146. MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY OFFICE
THAILAND, FACTS AND EVIDENCES ON THE 10 BURNING ISSUES RELATED TO THE
GOVERNMENT USE OF PATENTS ON THREE PATENTED ESSENTIAL DRUGS IN THAILAND
Preface (2007), available at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=7349 (link
to pdf is in the middle of the page) [hereinafter Thailand White Paper].
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means of getting a price reduction.147 As a result of Thailand’s decision
to use the compulsory licensing provision, Abbott announced that it will
not introduce new medicines into the country.148 Abbott’s reaction
shocked the international community because Thailand’s citizens will be
deprived of several new essential drugs as a result of Abbott’s withdrawal from the Thai market.149
Although Abbott’s reaction may not be justified, it is a potential hazard
for a country that plans to use the compulsory licensing provision. However, Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision remains good
policy because it is readily distinguished from the situation in Thailand.
Unlike Thailand’s use of the compulsory licensing provision, Brazil only
used the provision one time, it engaged in long negotiations with Merck
prior to issuing the license, and it used the provision to import generic
HIV/AIDS drugs.150
First, unlike Thailand, which issued three licenses within a three month
period, Brazil has used the compulsory licensing provision only once in
its entire history.151 Although Brazil has made repeated threats to use the
provision in its negotiations with pharmaceutical companies, this is different than actual use of the provision because there remains a possibility
of negotiating an agreement between the parties. This is demonstrated by
the successful negotiations of the Brazilian government, which has been
able to use the threat of compulsory licensing in order to negotiate for
lower drug prices without resorting to actual use of the provision.152
Second, Brazil’s situation is different from Thailand because Brazil attempted to negotiate with Merck for two years prior to issuing the li-

147. Id. at 6.
148. On March 16, 2007, Abbott Laboratories announced that it would no longer introduce new medicines in Thailand. Abbott Says it Will Not Introduce New Drugs in Thailand, 21 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 04 (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter BNA Report
Thailand]. The company was responding to Thailand’s recent decisions to issue compulsory licenses on “essential” medications. Id. Abbott’s spokeswoman justified her company’ actions by explaining that Thailand chose to break numerous patents on medicines,
ignoring the patent system and as a result, Abbott elected to not introduce new medicines
into the country. Id.
149. Id. The international non-profit organization Doctors Without Borders has called
this decision “appalling” and “a major betrayal to patients.” Id. Among the drugs that will
not be introduced in Thailand as a result of Abbott’s withdrawal from the Thai market is
the heat-stable version of the vital second-line anti-retroviral Lopinavir. MSF Article,
supra note 83. This anti-retroviral is needed in HIV/AIDS programs and has several advantages, most importantly the fact that it does not need to be refrigerated. Id.
150. See supra notes 82–90 and accompanying text.
151. Consumer Tech, supra note 11.
152. Id.
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cense.153 Although prior negotiations may not have been necessary under
the national emergency or non-commercial use exceptions of the compulsory licensing provision,154 Brazil’s willingness to negotiate an
agreement with Merck prior to issuing the license sends a positive signal
to pharmaceutical companies by demonstrating that Brazil is serious
about patent protection.
Finally, Brazil’s case is distinguishable from Thailand because Brazil
did not use the provision to import a controversial drug. Thailand’s use
of the provision to produce Plavix, a heart disease medication,155 is contentious because it demonstrates that Thailand is willing to invoke the
provision for any drug available on the market, even for drugs that are
primarily sold to developed countries.156 Moreover, this is the first time
the provision has been used to produce a chronic disease medication and
it is unclear if such drugs are an acceptable use of the compulsory licensing provision.157 By contrast, Brazil used the compulsory licensing provision to produce generic HIV/AIDS drugs.158 The use of the compulsory
licensing provision for HIV/AIDS medication is not controversial because HIV/AIDS is explicitly listed in the provision under the national
emergency exception159 and the provision has been used several times
before to produce generic HIV/AIDS drugs.160
The differences between Brazil and Thailand’s use of the compulsory
licensing provision are further highlighted by Abbott’s reaction to Brazil’s compulsory license. In July of 2007, Abbott agreed to provide Brazil a 29.5% reduction on its HIV/AIDS drug Kaletra.161 The disparate
reactions of the pharmaceutical industry and the major differences between the countries’ use of the compulsory licensing provision demonstrates that, unlike Thailand, Brazil’s use of the provision sets a positive
example for how the compulsory licensing provision should be used in
the future.
153. See EssentialDrugs, supra note 84.
154. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 31(b).
155. BNA Report Thailand, supra note 148.
156. BNA Report Thailand, supra note 148. The pharmaceutical industry is concerned
that Thailand’s actions indicate that compulsory licensing will become a “routine occurrence in the operation of Thailand’s public health system.” Id.
157. For a discussion of the validity of Thailand’s compulsory license for Plavix and
its effect on international health and trade, see Brent Savoie, Thailand’s Test: Compulsory Licensing in an Era of Epidemiological Transition, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 211 (2007).
158. BNA Report, supra note 1.
159. Doha Declaration, supra note 37, ¶ 5(c).
160. Consumer Tech, supra note 11.
161. Government Abbott Reach Agreement to Reduce Price of AIDS Drug Kaletra, 21
World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 08 (Aug. 2007).
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Although Brazil’s use of the compulsory licensing provision sets good
policy, a country seeking to invoke the compulsory licensing provision
must exercise caution. The situation in Thailand demonstrates that use of
the compulsory licensing provision is risky. This is because pharmaceutical companies may stop introducing drugs into a developing country if
they believe that the country is not respectful of patent protection on
pharmaceuticals. Thus the future of compulsory licensing remains uncertain and the use of the provision must be evaluated according to the circumstances in each case.
CONCLUSION
In the context of pharmaceuticals, the compulsory licensing provision
in the TRIPS agreement has most often been used to provide generic
HIV/AIDS drugs for least developed countries.162 Brazil’s recent use of
compulsory licensing calls into question the scope and meaning of the
provision by asking whether a large middle-income country like Brazil,
with a relatively low rate of infection,163 should be able to use the provision in order to import generic HIV/AIDS medication. The text of the
compulsory licensing provision and the Doha Declaration support the
legal validity of Brazil’s actions. Likewise, in the context of HIV/AIDS,
Brazil’s actions create good policy for the future use of the provision by
middle-income countries. However, as the recent dispute between Abbott
and Thailand demonstrates, use of compulsory licensing is a risky endeavor and may not set good policy in every circumstance.
The goal of the TRIPS agreement is to balance the protection of intellectual property in order to incentivize future R&D while providing various exceptions, such as compulsory licensing, in order to reduce the
short term costs of intellectual property protection. Although compulsory
licensing provides a mechanism for increasing access to medicines in
developing countries, this option is difficult and risky. Furthermore, in
the context of pharmaceuticals, the protection of intellectual property
raises an ethical dilemma. Questions of intellectual property in this context can be a life or death matter because residents of developing countries are dying of diseases such as AIDS because they cannot afford to
buy essential medications.
There have been many proposed solutions that address the access to
medicine gap between developed and developing countries.164 One such
162. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 136–137 and accompanying text.
164. For example, the economist Joseph Steiglitz proposes a system of financial government prizes to complement the current patent system. Joseph E. Steiglitz, Editorial,
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solution addresses the role of research universities, who have a responsibility to ensure that their research reaches the people who need it most.165
Universities are a major contributor to pharmaceutical patent innovation
and they own patent rights to key HIV/AIDS drugs that are on the market.166 Universities can manage their pharmaceutical patents to ensure
that the HIV/AIDS medications that are a product of university research
are sold at affordable prices in developing countries.167 This means that
universities can bargain for specific licensing terms in their agreements
with pharmaceutical companies that will ensure low-cost access to pharmaceuticals in the developing world.168 This approach requires that stu-

Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 1279, 1279–80 (2006),
available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/reprint/333/7582/1279. The prizes will encourage
research on neglected diseases that mostly afflict developing countries, such as malaria
and tuberculosis. Id. This medical prize fund would give large rewards for cures or vaccines for diseases like malaria, that affect millions, and smaller rewards for drugs that are
minor variations on existing ones. Id. The prizes would be funded by governments in
developed countries. Id.
Another solution to the current international patent system is proposed by Jean
Lanjouw, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, who argues that setting minimum
standards of patent protection in all countries is unfair. Jean O. Lanjouw, Opening Doors
to Research: A New Global Patent Regime for Pharmaceuticals, 21 BROOKINGS REV. 13–
17 (2003). Lanjouw argues that patent rights in developing countries make drugs such as
ARVs unaffordable and do not encourage research on diseases that primarily affect developing countries. Id. Lanjouw suggests that in order for a system of intellectual property to be fair, it will need to recognize the differences in the development level of countries. Id. One solution is to establish a system where patent protection in poor countries
differs across diseases depending on the importance of those countries’ markets as a potential source of research incentives. Id. Thus, patent protection would be minimal in the
poorest countries and would increase gradually to cover more diseases, starting with diseases like malaria that are particularly prevalent in developing countries. Id.
165. Dave A. Chokshi & Rahul Rajkumar, Leveraging University Research to Advance
Global Health, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1934, 1934 (2007).
166. Id. In 2002, research universities in the U.S. were estimated to have contributed
$19.6 billion to “the drug development pipeline.” Id. University hold patents to one third
of HIV drugs approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration between 1987 and
2007. Id.
167. Id. at 1935.
168. Id. at 1935. One such successful campaign took place at Yale University where a
coalition of students and faculty requested that Yale, the patent holder to an important
ARV, negotiate with Bristol-Meyers Squibb, the distributor of this ARV. Rahul Rajkumar, The Role of Universities in Addressing the Access and Research Gaps, Universities
Allied for Essential Medicines National Conference 7–11 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.essentialmedicine.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2007/10/uaemconferenc
e2007-day-1-role-of-universities.pdf. Yale successfully worked with Bristol-Meyers
Squibb to ensure that its patents do not prevent inexpensive HIV/AIDS therapy in developing countries. Id.
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dents organize local, campus-based campaigns in order to pressure universities to include access provisions in their licensing agreements with
pharmaceutical companies.169 Through local activism, the students and
faculty of research universities can have a major impact on the high price
of medication in developing countries.
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